

Towards An Integrative and Intersubjective Understanding of Remembrance

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## Abstract

This paper explores the theological and psychological underpinnings of remembrance. The primary intent of this paper is to integrate biblical examples of remembrance with concepts and processes within intersubjectivity, in order to help integrative clinicians take intersubjectivity more seriously. Whereas many psychological theories offer understandings of memory, including one-person psychologies such as cognitive behavioral therapy, a two-person psychology like intersubjectivity is offered as a corrective to be able to extend the construct of memory to remembrance, which is inherently a co-created and relational memory experience. Distinctions between memory and remembrance are offered in order to highlight the two-person nature of remembrance. Specifically, three uses of remembrance in Scripture—*anamnesis*, *zakar*, and *mnemoneuo*—are exegeted and integrated with intersubjective and relational models of psychotherapy. Potential clinical applications of these three forms of remembrance are discussed from an intersubjective perspective, with particular attention given to the mutual influence on the therapist and his or her parallel process of remembrance in therapy.

*Keywords:* remembrance, memory, intersubjectivity, two-person psychology, mutuality

### Towards an Integrative and Intersubjective Understanding of Remembrance

The function and cognitive mechanisms underlying the human capacity for memory and remembrance has been explored widely across numerous academic disciplines. The cognitive neuroscience of memory and remembrance has its primary origin in evolutionary biology (Squire & Schacter, 2003), and as such, the complex cortical development unique to humans facilitates the higher-order processing needed for complex remembrance and memory functioning. Furthermore, beyond the adaptive and evolutionary advantages of utilizing memory to increase one's chances of physical survival (Nairne, 2010), the act of remembrance has strong grounding in relational, emotional, and theological bases.

Consequently, remembrance and memory are crucial components of many models of psychotherapy and theories of personhood (Beck, 2011; Stolorow, 2007; Mitchell, 2000); each theory offers various interpretations of the therapeutic action of remembrance and working with clients' memories and narratives in the consulting room in order to facilitate change. As David Leichter (2011) asserts, individuals and communities alike inevitably "participate in narratives and have a specific self-understanding that arises from the ways that they remember themselves to have been" (p. 9). Through exploring the relational and intersubjective examples of remembrance between the Israelites and God offered throughout the Judeo-Christian biblical narrative, this paper will seek to argue that remembrance in psychotherapy cannot be reduced to a unidirectional process or one-person model of cognitive retrieval; instead, remembrance that honors its theological significance may be understood as an emergent, co-constructed, and relational process within therapy. As such, biblical examples of remembrance will be integrated with concepts from intersubjectivity and contemporary relational psychoanalysis. In so doing, it will be argued that this paper will use theology to help integrative clinicians to take

intersubjectivity more seriously, as they participate in the mutually transforming and thick integrative practice of remembrance.

### **Working Definitions of “Remembrance” vs. “Memory”**

Although there are numerous existing definitions of remembrance, a singular yet two-part working definition of remembrance will be offered for the sake of this paper. In addition to its original Hebrew translations, which will be explicated for theological and clinical import in the latter portion of this paper, the working definition of remembrance to be used throughout the argument necessarily contains both active and passive components. Definitionally, it is both, “the act or fact of remembering,” which assumes a more active state, as well as “the state of being remembered,” (Remembrance, 2017a) which nuances an additional, passive state that includes another remembering participant. Similarly, other helpful definitions include “the state of bearing in mind” as well as “an act of recalling to mind” (Remembrance, 2017b).

As such, it will be argued that this twofold definition of remembrance fits best with two-person models of psychotherapy, as the nature of remembrance inherently contains multiple subjectivities processing the memories at both conscious and unconscious levels. First, I suggest that remembrance must include an agent—who is the subject remembering, as well as a referent—who is the (sometimes implicit) indirect object of what or who is being remembered. Lastly, I propose that there is often a participatory evoker as well—who is the subject that evokes the agent’s process of remembrance through the interpersonal interaction.

In contrast to remembrance, memory is defined as “the mental capacity or faculty of retaining and reviving facts, events, impressions, etc., or of recalling or recognizing previous experiences” (Memory, 2017). Therefore, for the sake of this paper, I am differentiating remembrance—as a relational and interpersonal process that always involves multiple

subjectivities—from the concept of memory, which can be reduced to a function of cognitive processing and may often take place intrapsychically within a single subject. Simply put, Coetzee and Rau (2009) contend that remembrance extends memory to be a more dynamic process best defined as the “memory *experience*” [emphasis added]. As follows, it is important to note how memory plays a leading role in the dynamic process of remembrance, within and between two subjects, as in the client and therapist dyad in psychotherapy, which will be explored in further sections of this paper.

### **Differing Psychotherapeutic Theories of Memory**

As previously mentioned, memory is theoretically and clinically attended to in most popular psychotherapies, and each model conceptualizes the function or therapeutic action of memory differently (Beck, 2011; Stolorow, 2007; Mitchell, 2000). Moreover, each theory uniquely asserts the role of therapist in facilitating the client’s change, though not all explicitly qualify the emotional responses the therapist may have to the client’s memories as they emerge in session. Fewer theories furthermore acknowledge the potential for mutual impact on the therapist in participating in the client’s or even her own remembrance.

Though many one-person models of psychology might disagree with my core assertion, cognitive behavioral therapy will specifically be explored as it relates to its understanding of memory and remembrance. Clinical applications and considerations for working with memory will be examined within a cognitive behavioral framework, in order to be compared to an intersubjectivist approach. Limitations of a cognitive behavioral therapy model will be briefly presented in order to contextualize the proposed significance of favoring an intersubjective understanding of remembrance in integrative psychotherapy.

### **Memory in Cognitive Behavioral Therapy**

Memory has been addressed widely and explicitly throughout evidence-based treatments within cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT), specifically in work with clients who experience intrusive memories following trauma, using a model like trauma focused cognitive behavioral therapy and cognitive processing therapy. While there is no uniform CBT theory of memory, the understanding of memory may perhaps be related to the core schemas and beliefs a client has about himself, others, and the world, which according to CBT practitioners are formed in early childhood (Persons, 2008). Beck's cognitive theory posits that a schema can be present but latent until activated through events that match the client's schema (Beck, 1983, as cited in Persons, Davidson, & Tompkins, 2001). For example, an adult client may hold a distorted, negative schema that is marked by maladaptive beliefs (e.g., "I am worthless" or "Others don't care about me") because of experiences, or even memories, of negative events in childhood in which his mother was overly critical of him.

In order for this schema to change, Beck proposes that activation of the fear network must occur alongside the therapist's "presentation of information that disconfirms key elements of the network" (Persons, 2008, p. 32). In other words, the CBT therapist would utilize *in vivo*, imaginal exposure, or empty chair interventions to re-create the early events in which the client learned these schemas in order to "rework the event and its meaning to [him]" (Persons, pp. 32-33). The CBT therapist would be ultimately concerned with re-creating these memories in session so as to desensitize and reduce the client's negative affect around those memories when they come up for him inside and outside of therapy. Therefore, the CBT therapist is a participant in the process of therapeutic change with the client; however, the conceptualization and

therapeutic action of the therapist's participation differs from two-person psychologies such as intersubjectivity or contemporary relational psychoanalysis.

### **Intersubjectivist Response to Cognitive Behavioral Therapy**

While CBT does require the therapist's participation to activate the client's schemas as they emerge in therapy, this model fails to address memory in its appropriate context as a deeply relational and interpersonal process. It does not recognize the emergent relationship occurring with that particular therapist as central to the activation and re-creating of such schemas or memories. In essence, the primary critique of a CBT approach to understanding memory is that it is limited in its scope because of its lack of significance given to the person of the therapist and her personal, subjective experience of the schema or memory that gets activated.

Stolorow and Atwood (1996) articulate the theory of intersubjectivity as intended to encapsulate the larger relational system or field in which the client's experience is continually and mutually shaped. Specifically, Stolorow and Atwood offer a theory of "interacting subjectivities, reciprocal mutual influence, ... attempting to capture the endlessly shifting, constitutive intersubjective context of intrapsychic experience, both in the psychoanalytic situation and in the course of psychological development" (1996, p. 181). Moreover, the theory privileges the emergent relationship between the analyst and client as central to therapeutic change, and as a result, "the impact of the analyst and his or her organizing activity on the unfolding of the relationship itself becomes a focus of analytic investigation and reflection" (p. 181).

Whereas intersubjectivists most often utilize the language of "remembrance" theoretically, because of its interpersonal and relational nature, CBT therapists arguably flatten this construct to represent the client's "memory" alone. In doing so, this characterizes the

process as rooted in a one-person psychology, limited to “memory” rather than an emergent, co-created, and two-person psychology of “remembrance,” in which both subjectivities participate and influence each other. Likewise, there is less emphasis on mutual recognition, in which the therapist might also be personally activated or come to more consciously integrate parts of her own storied past as a result of a parallel process of remembrance, emerging out of the client’s remembrance.

### **The Nature and Function of Memory in Psychotherapy**

Memory is a complex neurobiological concept and has various cognitive disciplines dedicated to its processes; as such, the nature and function of memory will be briefly explored in order to present its import and common uses in psychotherapy broadly. Memory formation involves three core phases: encoding, storage, and retrieval. In each of these processes, emotion plays an important role, as is reflected in the complex neural circuitry connecting the brain’s primary memory structures to the limbic system for frequent activation and communication regarding emotion and behavior (Squire & Schacter, 2003).

Furthermore, memory cannot be reduced to a single aspect or cognitive task. The nature and neurocognitive mechanisms of memory have been studied extensively, particularly in the following areas: sensory, implicit, procedural, episodic, semantic, declarative, explicit, short-term/working, long-term, retrospective, prospective, verbal, visual, and visuospatial (Squire & Schacter, 2003; Eysenck, 2012; Damasio, Everett, & Bishop, 1996). In addition, memory has been written about extensively within intersubjective, interpersonal, relational psychoanalytic, and attachment circles. These forms of memory include nonverbal, relational, embodied, and conscious/unconscious memory (Mitchell, 2000; Stolorow, 2007; Van der Kolk, 2014; Wallin, 2007). Memory also has been explored within literature on dissociation (Bromberg, 2011) and



unformulated experience (Stern, 2010), as relational and attachment trauma contributes to the fragmentation of memory and experience of unintegrated self-states.

Subsequently, it is important to ask, why do we remember or what do we remember for? Cognitive psychologist, Hans Eysenck (2012) purports that if humans could not remember past events, we could not develop or learn language, form relationships, or even have a personal identity; remembrance is thus central to not only our individual, intrapsychic selves but also our communal, interpsychic identities. From an intersubjectivist perspective, the purpose of remembrance is arguably to know and to be known—to remember and be remembered—as a way of experiencing the fullness of human capacity for relationality. This similarly echoes the complementary passive and active definitional attributes of remembrance, which comprise the two-person model in which remembrance always involves another subjectivity.

Whereas the function of memory itself may be more intrapsychic in its goal of “attuning the individual to the world, drawing ever more of the outer world into relevant interaction with the inner world reflected in the mind,” (Sullivan, 1995, p. 398) remembrance has a strong ontological purpose. Sullivan (1995) similarly argues, “Having remembered, humans find the original disposition with which they were created, and which allows them to understand things as they truly are” (p. 388). In addition, theologically, remembrance may contribute to the restoration of the created order of Genesis 1 on earth, through greater consolidation of self and deep relational knowing of others. Knowing oneself and others intimately may further facilitate greater closeness and experience of God himself, along with greater ownership and remembrance of one’s true identity rooted in Christ.

### **God as One Who Remembers in the Old Testament**

Across the Old Testament canon, God is continually represented as one who remembers his promises made to his people. The words “remembrance” or “remember” when used in these contexts are translated from the original Hebrew noun, “*zeker*,” which Elwell (1997) clarifies is a word used exclusively in reference to God’s own memory or remembrance, because of the way he reveals his name, Yahweh, in the fulfillment of his covenantal promises. Specifically, Yahweh is said to remember his covenantal relation with Israel ten times (Elwell), including passages such as, “He remembers [*zeker*] his covenant forever, the word that he commanded, for a thousand generations” (Psalm 105:8, ESV) as well as in Leviticus 26:45, Psalm 106:45, and Psalm 111:5. He furthermore holds true to his promise to remember his covenant with Noah in Genesis 9:15. Additionally, he remembers the actual event of the making of the covenant itself, as evidenced in passages such as Exodus 32:13, Leviticus 26:42, Deuteronomy 9:27, and 2 Chronicles 6:42.

It is through the repeated action of God’s remembrance of what he promised that his faithfulness and steadfast character is shown to his people. His consistency and dependability of remembering what he said he would accomplish is what allows the Israelites to enter into greater relational intimacy and trust with him in carrying out his kingdom purposes. In part, through numerous examples of *zeker* throughout the Old Testament, God acts as an agent of remembrance, holding true to his covenantal promises to the Israelites—the referents of said remembrance. Because of God’s remembrance, the Israelites are able to remember God’s covenant with them in times of exile and wilderness, and are able to likewise respond as agents themselves; these biblical examples of their mutually-influencing relationship embodies the similar kind of two-person remembrance possible in intersubjective psychotherapy.

### **The Israelites’ Remembrance**

As previously mentioned, the Old Testament references the remembrance of the Israelites many times, often in relation to their covenant with Yahweh. Whereas God's remembrance is exclusive to a single word (*zeker*), three variants of remembrance are used and distinguished throughout the original Hebrew text: *anamnesis*, *zakar*, and *mnemoneuo*. The theological importance and context for each of these forms of remembrance will each be explored in order to increase the potential for a theology of remembrance to be integrated with intersubjectivity in psychotherapy.

### *Anamnesis*

*Anamnesis*, or specifically, sacramental remembrance, is used widely in the context of remembrance as part of the Lord's Supper and the Passover (Elwell, 1997). When used in the Old Testament, *anamnesis* is linked to sacrifice and offering as part of a ritual of memorial, and implies the Israelites take an active commitment to remembering (Jones, 1986). In the New Testament, Christians partaking in the Eucharist similarly remember the Passover and faithfulness of God alongside the atoning work of Christ on the cross. Jesus models to the Disciples the centrality of remembrance at the Eucharist Table, saying "And he took bread, and when he had given thanks, he broke it and gave it to them, saying, 'This is my body, which is given for you. Do this in remembrance [*anamnesis*] of me,'" (Luke 22:19, ESV). The same language is used in passages like 1 Corinthians 11:24-25 and Hebrews 10:3. In so doing, Christians remember the character of God and their relationship with the God who remembered there-and-then and will continue to remember here-and-now. As Ginn (1989) asserts,

In the Passover, the participant in the first place looked back and remembered and was reminded of the power of God and of his presence. In the Eucharist, the Christian would

also look back and remember and be reminded. The very economy of the traditional words of Jesus precludes any ambiguity. (pp. 20-21)

As an objective concept, to remember sacramentally—to participate in *anamnesis*—is to act in such a way as to demonstrate one’s embodied commitment to God. Jones (1986) aptly concludes, one “who remembers God allows his or her entire being and activity to be directed by God. Therefore, to remember God is identical with seeking God, and that is to say to obey God. Remembrance cannot be separated from action” p. 436).

### *Zakar*

Second, the numerous references in the Old Testament of the concept of episodic remembrance, or *zakar* (a close variant of *zeker*, God’s remembrance), are made to emphasize the temporal nature of episodic remembrance. Elwell (1997) defines *zakar* as the act of making the past present through the process of remembrance. This has strong historical and eschatological significance in its import for the vision of the future alongside the merging of the past and present. As Ginn (1989) suggests, “Remembrance bridged past and present. The intricate pattern of reminders to remember continually confronted the pious Jew and challenged him to hold his God in memory... To hold God in memory meant to live in his presence” (p. 15).

Likewise, *zakar* remembrance used in the context of remembering the Passover “not only looked back to past deliverance, but also looked forward to future deliverance... to the Exodus and to the Coming of the Messiah” (Ginn, 1989, p. 21). For example, Old Testament passages such as Deuteronomy 8:2, 2 Samuel 14:11, Nehemiah 13:14, Job 10:9, and Psalm 45:17 illustrate this bridging of the past and present in remembering and petitioning God to continue to demonstrate his covenantal faithfulness: “And you shall remember [*zakar*] the whole way that the Lord your God has led you these forty years in the wilderness, that he might humble you,

testing you to know what was in your heart, whether you would keep his commandments or not” (Deuteronomy 8:2, ESV).

Essentially, in order to encounter the present faithfulness of God, remembrance is needed to make the past actions of God present. Leichter (2011) states that if understanding in remembrance involves rediscovering the “I in the Thou” to include “the relationship between the past and the present, it follows that we understand the past on the basis of the present and that we come to understand the present only insofar as we understand the past” (p. 35). Thus, it is with careful attention to the past historical work and character of God that Christians are able to presently integrate their experience of God in its proper temporal context, which both honors God’s prior actions and petitions his present reciprocal participation with them. Again, this more two-person model for remembrance, in which both parties mutually transform the other, has strong complements in intersubjective approaches to engaging remembrance in therapy.

### ***Mnemoneuo***

A third variation of remembrance, found in the New Testament, is *mnemoneuo*, which in Greek represents a more consolidating act of remembrance (Elwell, 1997). In Scriptural uses of *mnemoneuo*, remembrance is intended to facilitate the consolidation of theological or moral lessons learned (Elwell). Whereas in *anamnesis* and *zakar*, in which God is referred to either directly or indirectly, *mnemoneuo* centers on simply holding God in mind as it relates to the moral instruction that he offered; as such, the focus is more on the particular lesson to be recalled than on God himself or his character. For example, Paul exhorts the churches in Galatia and Corinth to remember in terms of keeping someone in mind, to presently pray for him, and to care for those marginalized in their communities (Galatians 2:10; Colossians 4:18). Similarly, in Revelation, John commands, “Remember [*mnemoneuo*] therefore from where you have fallen;

repent, and do the works you did at first” (2:5a, ESV). In short, this type of remembrance is intended to be used as a way of consolidating and holding in mind what one learned and was taught by God; the result of such *mnemoneuo* would be greater obedience and sanctification in response to God’s remembrance of his people.

### **Integrating the Theological Bases of Remembrance with Intersubjective Psychotherapy**

Each of the three words used for the Israelites’ remembrance (*anamnesis*, *zakar*, *mnemoneuo*) have implications for potential integration in intersubjective psychotherapy with Christian clients. These implications will be explored so as to address the problem of incompatibility with existing psychological theories or models of therapy that favor one-person models of memory. Instead, I will demonstrate how theology can be used to move towards an integrative and intersubjective understanding of remembrance in psychotherapy.

### **Intersubjective Therapy as Repeated Engagement with Client’s Storied Past**

The *anamnesis* of the Israelites in the Old Testament represented their sacramental remembrance and active participation in ritualistic sacrifice out of faithfulness to God and his own remembrance. Psychotherapy broadly, can be considered a liturgical practice or embodied ritual (Smith, 2009) in which both clients and therapist partake. The very participation in weekly psychotherapy as an ongoing ritual is a similarly sacred, repeated rhythm of *anamnesis* remembrance, much like the Israelites in recalling the Passover and the Church of God in taking of the Lord’s Supper.

Furthermore, *anamnesis* in integrative and intersubjective psychotherapy may include the comprehensive remembrance of many aspects of the client’s narrative. This may entail recalling the traditions, religious rituals, relational and family dynamics, and all influences of historical culture that precede and contextualize the client’s story and memory of past experiences, which

may otherwise get unethically reduced to demographic information confined to the initial therapy session. For the integrative clinician, this has particular import when working with Christian clients, as the *anamnesis* holds greater theological significance for situating oneself within the tradition and history of people of God who have “remembered” their collective narrative for centuries.

Simultaneously, an intersubjective approach to therapy would suggest that the same process of remembrance is taking place on the side of the therapist, as her participation in the co-created dynamics of therapy contribute to the remembrance of her own storied past, whether recalled consciously or unconsciously. Ultimately, the client acts as the agent of remembrance, in which her story or culture is the referent, and the therapist’s unique subjectivity contributes to her role as the participatory evoker; likewise, the therapist engages in a parallel process of as the agent of her own remembrance.

### **Intersubjective Therapy as Focused on Both There-and-Then and Here-and-Now**

The temporal nature of *zakar* remembrance has several potential applications to intersubjective models of therapy. What is unique to *zakar* is its action of making the past present; this dovetails nicely with the therapeutic action of contemporary relational psychoanalysis and intersubjectivity, which make use of relational enactments as a way of consciously bringing the client’s past into the here-and-now. In fact, Loewald (1989) describes the juncture between the there-and-then and here-and-now as part of the emergent process of intersubjective therapy. Besides, the goal of intersubjective psychotherapy is to facilitate the co-construction of new memories, as the past is made present through relational enactments in the therapeutic relationship that give way to corrective emotional and relational experiences.

This has particular relevance for intersubjective therapists working with clients who have experienced relational, physical, or emotional trauma. Similar to the *zakar* (episodic) remembrance of the Israelites that is centered on remembering the past as it is made present, intersubjective psychotherapy values both the past memory and here-and-now experience of sharing the memory in the process of reconstructing the traumatic memory. Bromberg (2011) contends this can be achieved through evoking previously dissociated self-states, as he emphasizes,

Emotion schemas can be changed only to the extent that *experiences in the present and memories of the past are held in working memory simultaneously* with the pulses of core consciousness that depend on activation of the bodily components of the schema... the activation of dissociated painful experience in the session itself is central to the therapeutic process. (p. 787, emphasis added)

In short, the process of working through the past by way of addressing “collisions” (Bromberg, 2011) and relational enactments in the here-and-now can best be understood through a two-person model like intersubjectivity. This is because in such models, the therapist also contributes to the enactment in evoking something unique based on the co-created relational experience. In so doing, this presents a potential application of the helpfulness of *zakar* remembrance within intersubjective psychotherapy.

### **Intersubjective Therapy as Consolidation of Prior Memory and Self-Meaning**

Much like the purpose of *mnemoneuo* remembrance in seeking to consolidate the Israelites’ moral and theological lessons, intersubjectivity arguably builds upon aspects of *zakar* and *mnemoneuo* remembrance in its aim to reintegrate and consolidate prior memory or self-experience. Bromberg (2011) offers,



When the work is going well, individual affective reactions of each partner are jointly subsumed as a process of *mutual* knowing or state-sharing that not only is therapeutic in its own right but deepens... each partner's 'not-me' experience- thus allowing the greatest potential for new self-meaning to emerge and endure. (p. 70)

Though this work can be painful, slow, and gradual, it is the ongoing process of *mnemoneuo* that is essential to helping the client to cohere a sense of self. Correspondingly, in this process of consolidating remembrance, both the client and the therapist experience a greater sense of knowing his or her self, in addition to being known, that could not be achieved independently. As previously stated, this may facilitate deeper intimacy, on the part of both the Christian client and integrative therapist, in relationship with God who is fully omniscient and all remembering (Psalm 139).

In like manner, in Islam, "the function of the prophet is 'to remind (*dhikr*, in Arabic)' people of what they already know but have forgotten or have distorted through oblivion or inaccurate recall" (Sullivan, 1995, p. 388). Perhaps then, it can be helpful to view Christian intersubjective therapists as quasi "prophets" in the consulting room, seeking to integrate clients' self-states and bring conscious awareness to their dissociated parts that have gotten "distorted through...inaccurate recall" embedded in relational and attachment trauma. It is through remembrance in the context of a relational home (Stolorow, 2007) that a sort of implicit relational knowing that has since been violated can become restored and mutual transformation may take place.

### **Termination and Remembrance**

A final potential consideration of the application of remembrance in intersubjective psychotherapy emerges at termination. It is not uncommon for a client to ask his therapist, "Will

you remember me?” in anticipation of the therapeutic work ending. From an intersubjective framework, it can be helpful to explore the client’s experience of what and how he remembered throughout the course therapy. Furthermore, as a way of processing the termination, it could be beneficial to pose a question to the client such as “Years from now, how will you look back and remember what took place between us here?” as well as to offer her own subjective response to the question, when appropriate. Similarly, it may also be helpful to consider how other memories of the client may be evoked for the therapist (and vice versa) sometime in the future, in which she will presently re-experience the past memory of being with that client in a new way, through *zakar* remembrance (i.e., “The next time I find myself in Berkeley, I will remember you; I know how much you were formed there in college, so I imagine you’ll come to my mind and I will remember the work we did together and have fun imagining what you might be up to now.”). Also, participating in a ritual of *anamnesis* such as reviewing process notes from time spent with the client may also aid the therapist in commemorating and metabolizing the relational work after treatment has ended. Engaging in *anamnesis* as a way to remember the client after termination may allow for the therapist to mentalize the work that was done and hold the client in mind longer-term.

### **Conclusion**

In conclusion, I have sought to integrate biblical examples of remembrance with concepts and processes within intersubjective theory, so as to help integrative clinicians take intersubjectivity more seriously. Addressing the problem of one-person models of therapy as inadequate to encompass the interpersonal nature of remembrance, I have offered a critique of cognitive behavioral therapy in favor of intersubjective and relational psychoanalytic psychotherapies. Three core variants of “remembrance” in the original Hebrew and Greek

translations were explored, in order to draw clinical implications for its uses when integrated with intersubjective psychotherapy.

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